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Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games
taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of or-
ganizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the
question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better.
However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks
warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate interplay between the hetero-
geneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links between the networks, and the
independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network. Presented results are robust to varia-
tions of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing social dilemma,
thus suggesting a high degree of universality.
Network reciprocity is amongst the most well-known
mechanisms that may sustain cooperation in evolutionary
games that constitute a social dilemma [1]. It was discovered
by Nowak and May [2], who observed that on structured pop-
ulations cooperators can aggregate into compact clusters and
so avoid being wiped out by defectors. Although the mecha-
nism may not work equally well for all social dilemmas [3],
and recent empirical evidence based on large-scale economic
experiments indicate that it may be compromised or fail alto-
gether [4, 5], there is still ample interest in understanding how
and why networks influence the evolution of cooperation. Re-
cent reviews are a testament to the continued liveliness of this
field of research [6–9].
Following the explorations of evolutionary games on in-
dividual small-world [10–14], scale-free [15–29], coevolving
[30–35], hierarchical [36] and bipartite [37] networks, the at-
tention has recently been shifting towards interdependent net-
works [38–42]. The latter have been put into the spotlight by
Buldyrev et al. [43], showing that even seemingly irrelevant
changes in one network can have catastrophic and very much
unexpected consequence in another network. Subsequently,
interdependent networks have been tested for their robustness
against attack and assortativity [44–47], properties of percola-
tion [48–52] and diffusion [53], and they have indeed become
a hot topic of general interest [54, 55], touching upon sub-
jects as diverse as epidemic spreading [56], the appearance
and promotion of creativity [57], and voting [58].
Previous research concerning evolutionary games on in-
terdependent networks has revealed, for example, that bi-
ased utility functions suppress the feedback of individual suc-
cess, which leads to a spontaneous separation of characteristic
time scales on the two interdependent networks [38]. Conse-
quently, cooperation is promoted because the aggressive inva-
sion of defectors is more sensitive to the deceleration. Even if
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the utilities are not biased, cooperation can still be promoted
by means of interdependent network reciprocity [39], which
however requires simultaneous formation of correlated coop-
erative clusters on both networks. It has also been shown that
the coupling of the evolutionary dynamics in each of the two
networks enhances the resilience of cooperation, and that this
is intrinsically related to the non-trivial organization of co-
operators across the interdependent layers [40]. Perhaps most
closely related to the setup of the present work is that by Wang
et al. [42], who showed that probabilistic interconnections be-
tween interdependent networks can very much promote the
evolution of cooperation. In our model, however, the strategy
transfer between networks is prohibited. The interdependence
is thus due solely to coupling together the payoffs of select
players that reside on different networks.
Here, we wish to determine how strong the interdepen-
dence between the networks really ought to be for the opti-
mal promotion of cooperation. Since existing works unequiv-
ocally declare that interdependence works in favor of the res-
olution of social dilemmas, one might intuitively assume that
the stronger the interdependence the better. As we will show,
however, this assumption is not necessarily true. To address
the problem, we consider primarily the prisoner’s dilemma
game on two square lattices, where a certain fraction of ran-
domly selected players is allowed to connect with the corre-
sponding players in the other lattice. While strategy trans-
fers between the two networks are not allowed, the additional
connections between the corresponding players do influence
their utility, and thus their ability to retain and possibly spread
their strategies on the home network. This introduces two new
parameters, namely the fraction of players that is allowed to
form links with the corresponding players in the other network
ρ, and the strength of this links α. Together, these two pa-
rameters determine the strength of interdependence, and also
the success of resolving social dilemmas. For further details
with regards to the studied evolutionary games, the applied
dynamical rule, and the topology of interaction networks, we
refer to the Methods section. Independent of the strategy up-
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FIG. 1: Tuning in on the optimal interdependence between two
square lattices for the resolution of the prisoner’s dilemma. Color
coded is the fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the fraction
of players that are allowed to form an external link ρ and the strength
of these links α, as obtained for b = 1.03 (a), b = 1.05 (b) and
b = 1.1 (c). Irrespective of b, there exists an intermediate value of
ρ ≈ 0.5 at which cooperation is optimally promoted. But in addition
to that, the value of α needs to be sufficiently large as well.
dating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the
governing social dilemma, we will show that cooperation is
promoted best if only an intermediate fraction of players is
allowed to have external links to the other network, but also
that those links should be sufficiently strong. We will also
reveal mechanisms that lead to the emergence of the optimal
interdependence.
Results
To begin with, we show in Fig. 1 the impact of parameters
ρ and α on the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma game. It
can be observed that there exists an intermediate range of the
fraction of players that are allowed to form an external link
at which cooperators fare best. Irrespective of the temptation
to defect b, values around ρ ≈ 0.5 yield an optimal outcome
of the social dilemma. Yet the coupling strength is important
too. Only if the value of α is sufficiently large are the players
able to utilize the advantage of being linked to their corre-
sponding players in the other network. Although the level of
cooperation appears to fade slightly beyond α = 0.7 if the
temptation to defect is low or moderate [panels (a) and (b)],
the prevailing conclusion is that the coupling strength needs
to be sufficiently strong.
To clarify the mechanism that is responsible for the pro-
motion of cooperation, we first monitor the evolution of co-
operation by measuring not just the overall average cooper-
ation level (fC), but separately also the average cooperation
level for players with (fCd) and without (fCo) external links to
the other network in dependence on the number of full Monte
Carlo steps (MCS), as defined in the Methods section. For eas-
ier reference, we will refer to individuals with external links
to the other network as “distinguished” and to those who have
no such links as “ordinary” players (note that the subscripts
in fCd and fCo are chosen accordingly). Figure 2 reveals
that the cooperation level amongst the distinguished players
who do have external links to the other network is signifi-
cantly higher than the cooperation level amongst the players
who are not externally linked. Expectedly, the overall cooper-
ation level is in-between fCd and fCo . The identified differ-
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FIG. 2: Distinguished players who have an external link with their
corresponding player in the other network are more likely to coop-
erate than those who are not externally linked. Depicted is the time
evolution of the fraction of cooperators in the whole population (fC ),
among the distinguished players (fCd ), and among ordinary players,
i.e., those that do not have an external link to the other network (fCo ).
It can be observed that fCd > fCo . Parameter values used were:
b = 1.05, ρ = 0.3 and α = 0.8.
ence between fCd and fCo is crucial, because it indicates that
players who have the ability to collect an additional payoff
from the other network are more likely to cooperate. Indeed,
the natural selection of the cooperative strategy among distin-
guished players is higher than in the whole population, which
is a consequence of an asymmetric strategy flow that emerges
between the distinguished and other players. Because of gen-
erally higher payoffs, the distinguished players are followed
by the others, which results in the selection of cooperation
around them. In other words, distinguished players with an
external link to the other network play the role of leaders in
the community, similarly as was reported many times before
for hubs on heterogeneous isolated (individual) networks [6].
To test this explanation further, we directly adjust the teach-
ing activity of players, i.e., the ability to pass their strategy to
a neighbor [59, 60], which can be done effectively by intro-
ducing a multiplication factor w to Eq. 1. We consider two
options. First, we depreciate all distinguished players by us-
ing w = 0.05 while keeping w = 1 for those who do not have
an external link, and second, we reverse these values. The ex-
pectation is that the first option will nullify the advantage of
interdependence between the two networks, while the second
option will further amplify the positive effects on the evolu-
tion of cooperation.
Figure 3 reveals nicely how the leading role of distin-
guished players improves the cooperation level [panels (a) and
(c)], yet only if distinguished players are not depreciated by
w = 0.05 [panel (b)]. For comparison, we show in panel (a)
the results obtained with the basic model where all players
have w = 1. There the change from α = 0 to α = 0.5 (note
that for α = 0 the difference between distinguished and ordi-
nary players vanishes) introduces a noticeable increase in the
critical temptation to defect where cooperators die out and an
overall increase in the level of cooperation. But if w = 0.05
is applied to distinguished players, then they become unable
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FIG. 3: Interdependence between networks favors cooperation only
if the awarded additional payoffs are not counteracted by reduced
teaching activity. Panel (a) depicts the fraction of cooperators fC in
dependence on the temptation to defect b for the basic version of the
game, where all players have teaching activity w = 1. In panel (b)
the teaching activity of all distinguished players who have an exter-
nal link to the other network is reduced to w = 0.05. It can be ob-
served that the promotion of cooperation due to the interdependence
vanishes. In panel (c) the teaching activity of all ordinary players
is reduced to w = 0.05, which further strengthens the leading role
of the distinguished players and leads to the strongest promotion of
cooperation. All panels feature results for α = 0 and α = 0.5 at
ρ = 0.5, where α = 0 means that effectively the two networks are
isolated, i.e., there is no interdependence because the links between
the two networks yield no additional utility to either player.
to lead the others despite of the fact that their utilities are
higher than those of their neighbors. In the absence of hi-
erarchy that was previously warranted by the interdependence
between networks, there will form no groups with homoge-
neous strategies, and hence the advantage of cooperation will
not be revealed. As panel (b) shows quite interestingly, α = 0
(absence of interdependence between networks) even slightly
outperforms α = 0.5, because a weak hierarchy is then re-
stored due to the unequal teaching activity of players. Note
that at α = 0.5 the unequal teaching activity is counteracted
by the additional payoff distinguished players receive from
the other network. At α = 0 this counterbalance is lost, and
the ordinary players become the leaders due to their higher
value of w. The positive effect on the level of cooperation is,
however, rather marginal.
In the opposite case, when distinguished players are en-
dowed with the full teaching activity w = 1 while ordi-
nary players without an external link are depreciated with
w = 0.05, the change from α = 0 to α = 0.5 is the strongest
[panel (c)]. Here the inequality of w and the additional pay-
offs stemming from the other network are able to strengthen
each other and fortify the leaders to yield the highest cooper-
ation level within the framework of this model. The enforced
role of distinguished players will cause an immediate reac-
tion from the followers, and this prompt reaction will select
the more successful cooperative strategy as described before.
From the technical point of view, it is interesting to note that
the curves for α = 0 in Figs. 3(b) and (c) coincide, because in
the absence of extra payoff from the other network it does not
matter whether distinguished or ordinary players are endowed
with w = 1 (or w = 0.05). Since the fraction of distinguished
players was set to ρ = 0.5, both fractions are equally large,
thus resulting in the same cooperation level.
Results presented in Fig. 3 and the pertaining interpretation
can be corroborated by comparing the evolution of coopera-
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FIG. 4: Decreasing the teaching activity of distinguished players nul-
lifies their higher propensity to cooperate, and it reduces the temp-
tation to defect that still warrants a healthy cooperation level in the
whole population. Depicted is the time evolution of the fraction of
cooperators in the whole population (fC ), among the distinguished
players (fCd ), and among ordinary players (fCo ). It can be observed
that fCd > fCo in panels (a) and (c), but not in panel (b). In the
latter, the teaching activity of all distinguished players who have an
external link to the other network is reduced to w = 0.05. In panel
(a) all players have w = 1, while in panel (c) the teaching activity
of all ordinary players is reduced to w = 0.05, which further ampli-
fies the fCd > fCo difference. We have used parameter values that
yield approximately the same overall level of cooperation (fC ) in all
three cases: ρ = 0.3, b = 1.05 and α = 0.8 for panel (a), ρ = 0.3,
b = 1.0 and α = 0.25 for panel (b), and ρ = 0.3, b = 1.09 and
α = 0.25 for panel (c).
tion within different groups of players, similarly as done in
Fig. 2 above. As Fig. 4(b) shows, when the teaching activity
is reduced for distinguished players the cooperation among
them is not favored by natural selection. Consequently, only
a very low value of b can ensure a reasonably high coopera-
tion level in the whole population because the latter is dragged
down considerably by the low fCd . There is a slight improve-
ment among other players, as evidenced by the higher fCo ,
which is due to a higher teaching activity. However, despite
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FIG. 5: Optimal interdependence between the two networks works
optimally only if the links connecting them go both ways. Depicted
is the fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the temptation to
defect b as obtained on an isolated network (reference case), on two
networks connected by means of unidirectional links, and on two mu-
tually interdependent networks. Cooperation is optimally promoted
only if there is independent formation of cooperative patterns on each
individual network, for which the chance for heterogeneity (distin-
guished players) needs to be provided on both of them. Parameter
values used were: ρ = 0.5 and α = 0.5.
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FIG. 6: Robustness of optimal network interdependence on different
strategy updating rules. Color coded is the fraction of cooperators
fC in dependence on the fraction of players that are allowed to form
an external link ρ and the strength of these links α, as obtained for
b = 1.4 and best-takes-over strategy updating (a), and b = 1.06 and
proportional imitation (b). Irrespective of the applied strategy updat-
ing rule, there exists an intermediate value of ρ at which cooperation
is optimally promoted, and the dependence on α is also qualitatively
the same as in Fig. 1, where the Fermi strategy adoption rule has been
used.
their higher teaching activity, ordinary players cannot lead the
whole population efficiently because distinguished players are
reluctant to follow them due to their higher individual utility.
If either the teaching activity of all players is left intact [panel
(a)] or the higher teaching activity is awarded to distinguished
players [panel (c)], then fCo < fCd , as observed initially in
Fig. 2. Thus, the basic mechanism of cooperation promotion
is restored or even additional fortified.
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the opti-
mal interdependence between the networks can work in fa-
vor of cooperation only if there are distinguished players in
both graphs. On the other hand, if the additional utilities flow
only in one direction, the mechanism will fail or yield only a
marginally better outcome. Results supporting this argumen-
tation are presented in Fig. 5. For reference, the outcome on
an isolated network is depicted as well. It can be observed
that if distinguished players in the first network can collect
additional payoffs from the second network, but the evolution
in the second network is independent from the first network
because players there are unable to collect additional payoffs
(the interdependence is unilateral), then the critical temptation
to defect b at which cooperators die out does not increase at
all. In fact, only the level of cooperation increases slightly
in the mixed C + D phase. If the interdependence is bilat-
eral, i.e., players on both networks can collect an additional
payoff from the other network, however, the positive impact
on the evolution of cooperation is much stronger. This high-
lights the importance of mutual interdependence and the inde-
pendent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual
network. Players connected to their corresponding partners in
the other network can support each other effectively only if
homogenous cooperative domains emerge on both networks.
Notably, the importance of correlated growth and formation
of cooperative domains has been emphasized already in [39],
although here they need not overlap geographically. We could
observe practically the same cooperation level when distin-
guished players collected additional payoffs from an ordinary
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FIG. 7: Robustness of optimal network interdependence on the topol-
ogy and the type of social dilemma. Color coded is the fraction of
cooperators fC in dependence on the fraction of players that are al-
lowed to form an external link ρ and the strength of these links α, as
obtained for b = 1.1 on the triangle lattice (a), and r = 0.3 (snow-
drift game) on the square lattice (b). The Fermi strategy adoption
rule has been used in both cases. Irrespective of the topology of each
individual network and the type of the governing social dilemma, the
results are qualitatively the same as in Figs. 1 and 6.
player in the other network. Namely, there is no need to link
distinguished players from different networks with one an-
other. The crucial condition is the chance of heterogeneity
on both networks [61], the positive effect of which can then
be mutually amplified through the interdependence.
Our argument for the spreading of cooperative behavior
among distinguished players can also be supported by how
the border of the full D phase behaves in dependence of ρ
and α at a high temptation to defect. As results presented in
Fig. 1(c) suggest, a smaller density of distinguished players
can be compensated by a higher value of α, but only up to
a certain point. At such a high temptation value cooperators
cannot survive even for large values of α if the density of dis-
tinguished players ρ is below a threshold value. Naturally, the
critical ρ depends slightly on the temptation to defect [com-
pare panels (b) and (c)], but the smallest value of the phase
transition point is close to the critical ρc = 0.1869(1) value of
jamming coverage of particles during a random sequential ad-
sorption when nearest and next nearest neighbor interactions
are excluded on a square lattice [62]. Shortly, if distinguished
players are too rare, then to support them via a high α will not
yield the desired impact because their influence cannot perco-
late. The latter, however, is an essential condition to maintain
cooperation, which was already pointed out in previous works
[63, 64].
It is lastly of interest to verify the robustness of these obser-
vations, first with regards to the strategy updating rule. As re-
sults presented in Fig. 6 demonstrate, our conclusions are not
restricted solely to the Fermi-type strategy updating [6, 65],
but remain valid also under the best-takes-over rule [2] and
proportional imitation [66]. In both cases an optimal inter-
mediate value of ρ is clearly inferable, and the positive effect
on the evolution of cooperation is the stronger the larger the
value of the coupling strength α. This is qualitatively identical
as observed in Fig. 1 with the Fermi rule.
Since previous works revealed that the clustering coeffi-
cient could be a decisive factor affecting the evolution of co-
5operation in games that are governed by pairwise interactions
[67, 68] (note that this is not the case for games governed by
group interactions [69]), it is also instructive to examine the
relevance of network interdependence under this condition.
Unlike the square lattice that has a zero clustering coefficient,
the triangular lattice has a high clustering coefficient, and thus
serves the purpose very well. Results presented in Fig. 7(a)
attest to the fact that the existence of optimal network inter-
dependence does not depend on structural properties of each
individual network, as indeed the α − ρ dependence of fC is
the same as observed before for the square lattice in Fig. 1.
To conclude, we extend our exploration also to other social
dilemmas, more precisely the snowdrift game, and as shown
in Fig. 7(b), the main conclusions remain intact. To reiterate,
the exists and intermediate level of interdependence between
networks that is optimal for the resolution of social dilemmas.
Discussion
Summarizing, we have studied the evolution of cooperation
in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game sub-
ject to interconnectedness by means of a different fraction of
differently strong links between the corresponding players re-
siding on the two interdependent networks. We have found
that for cooperation to be optimally promoted, the interdepen-
dence should stem only from an intermediate fraction of links
connecting the two networks, and that those links should af-
fect the utility of players significantly. The existence of opti-
mal interdependence has been attributed to the heterogeneity
that is brought about by the enhanced utility of those players
that do have external links to the other network, as opposed
to those who have not. This introduces asymmetric strategy
flow, which in turn leads to the emergence of influential lead-
ers that can act as strong cooperative hubs in their respective
networks. Importantly, the compact cooperative patterns that
appear independently on both networks support each other
mutually through the links that constitute the interdependence.
Indeed, we have shown that the mechanism works best only if
the interdependence is bilateral, and if the asymmetric strategy
flow is not counteracted by artificial low weights assigned to
the reproducibility of interconnected players. In case of unidi-
rectional interdependence or if the reproducibility of players is
altered, however, some marginal benefits for cooperators may
still exist, but these are then far removed from the full poten-
tial of interdependent networks to aid the resolution of social
dilemmas. We have tested the robustness of these conclusions
by replacing the Fermi strategy adoption rule with the best-
takes-over and the proportional imitation rule, as well as by
replacing the square lattice having zero clustering coefficient
with the triangle lattice that has a much higher clustering coef-
ficient, as well as finally by replacing the prisoner’s dilemma
game with the snowdrift game. Quite remarkably, we have
found that the optimal interdependence persist across all these
different setups, thus leading to the conclusion that it ought to
be to a large degree a universally valid phenomenon.
While the games on interdependent networks studied here
are not meant to model a particular real-life situation, they
nevertheless do capture the essence of some situations that
are viable in reality. For example, it is generally accepted
that not all individuals are equally fond of making connec-
tions outside of their natural environment. Similarly, some
would very much wish to do so, but may not have a chance.
These and similar considerations may all affect the level of in-
terdependence between two or more networks, and it is within
the realm of these possibilities that our study predicts the exis-
tence of an optimal level of interconnectedness. Future studies
could address the coupling of more complex (small world or
scale-free, for example) interaction topologies, the outcome
of other games on interdependent networks, such as for exam-
ple the traveler’s dilemma game that has recently been studied
in a spatial setting [70], as well as the impact of coevolution
and growth, both of which have recently been the subject of
much interest [71–75]. Overall, it seems safe to conclude that
the interdependence of interaction networks offers several ex-
citing possibilities for further research related to evolutionary
games, and it ought to bring the models a step closer to ac-
tual conditions, given that networks indeed rarely exist in an
isolated state.
Methods
The evolutionary game is staged on two square lattices,
each of size L×L, where initially each player x is designated
either as a cooperator (sx = C) or defector (sx = D) with
equal probability. Likewise randomly, a fraction ρ of play-
ers on each lattice is selected and allowed to form an external
link with a corresponding player in the other lattice. Although
we predominantly use the square lattice, we will also resort
to using the triangle lattice, given that the difference in the
clustering coefficient has been determined as a potentially key
factor for the outcome of games that are governed by pairwise
interactions [67, 68].
The accumulation of payoffs pix on both networks follows
the same standard procedure, depending on the type of the
governing social dilemma. In both games two cooperators
facing one another acquire R, two defectors get P , whereas
a cooperator receives S if facing a defector who then gains T .
The prisoner’s dilemma game is characterized by the tempta-
tion to defect T = b, reward for mutual cooperation R = 1,
and punishment P as well as the sucker’s payoff S equaling
0, whereby 1 < b ≤ 2 ensures a proper payoff ranking [2].
We note that qualitatively similar results are obtained also for
other values of S. The snowdrift game, on the other hand, has
T = β,R = β−1/2,S = β−1 and P = 0, where the tempta-
tion to defect can be expressed in terms of the cost-to-benefit
ratio r = 1/(2β − 1) with 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. Due to the inter-
dependence (external links between corresponding players),
however, the utilities used to determine fitness are not simply
payoffs obtained from the interactions with the nearest neigh-
bors on each individual network, but rather Ux = pix + αpix′
for players that have an external link, and Ux = pix otherwise.
The parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 determines the strength of external
links, i.e., the larger its value the higher the potential increase
of utility of two players that are connected by the external link.
6Importantly, while the interdependence affects the utility of
players, it does not allow strategies to be transferred between
the two networks. Thus, the evolution of the two strategies
proceeds in accordance with the standard Monte Carlo sim-
ulation procedure comprising the following elementary steps
for each network. First, a randomly selected player x acquires
its utility Ux by playing the game with all its nearest neigh-
bors and taking into account also the potential addition to the
utility stemming from the possible external link, as described
above. Next, one randomly chosen neighbor of x within the
same network, denoted by y, also acquires its utility Uy in
the same way. Lastly, player x attempts to adopt the strategy
sy from player y with a probability determined by the Fermi
function
W (sy → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(Ux − Uy)/K]
, (1)
where K = 0.1 quantifies the uncertainty related to the strat-
egy adoption process [6, 65]. The latter is usually associ-
ated with errors in decision making and imperfect information
transfer between the players. Notably, to test the robustness of
our findings, we will also use the best-takes-over [2] and the
proportional imitation [66] strategy updating rule. Regard-
less of which type of interaction network, evolutionary game,
or the strategy updating rule is used, in accordance with the
random asynchronous update, each player on both networks
is selected once on average during a full Monte Carlo step.
Moreover, sufficiently large system sizes (from L = 200 to
L = 800) and relaxation times need to be used to avoid finite
size effects and to ensure a stationary state has been reached.
Presented results were averaged over up to 30 independent
runs to further improve accuracy.
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